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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the application of the piercing the corporate veil concept in 
international arbitration.  Interpretation of this concept is inconsistent even within 
one domestic legal system, and it is even less predictable in international arbitration 
when several legal systems come into play.  Piercing the corporate veil may help to 
give a concrete practical meaning to the purpose of an arbitration agreement or a 
bilateral investment treaty.   However, there are downsides of such piercing because 
it negates many of the benefits which the corporate form offers.  
Domestic courts are likely not to recognize and enforce an arbitration award 
piercing the corporate veil in the absence of a written arbitration agreement. 
Jurisprudence under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”) Convention allows one to avoid the enforcement problem. However, the 
                                                                 
 1 The author wishes to thank Professor Reiner Kraakman of Harvard Law School for an 
interesting discussion on the problems examined in the article, Constantine Partasides on his 
comments on an earlier draft and participants of February 2010 Freshfields seminar in London 
for their feedback.  
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approaches of ICSID tribunals are inconsistent.  This article identifies three major 
conceptual approaches ICSID tribunals took in the past, namely: (1) declining 
jurisdiction in the absence of an explicit arbitration agreement, (2) piercing the veil 
by looking into the issue of foreign control, and (3) piercing the veil on the basis of 
interpretation of the concept of “investment” in accordance with the intent of parties 
to the arbitration agreement or purpose of an international treaty.   
The practical advice offered by this article is to make written arbitration clauses 
as inclusive as possible, to avoid dealing with piercing the corporate veil altogether. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
King Solomon ended up not splitting the baby when he understood who the real 
parent of the child was.2  Almost three thousand years after King Solomon, the 
judges and arbitrators might be fully aware of the real parent of the company, but it 
is very difficult to predict whether they would split the rights and liabilities, or treat 
the group of companies as one entity.   
When parties conclude a number of contracts at realization of a common 
economic transaction, advance planning for dispute resolution becomes an inherently 
complex issue.3  One of these complexities involves piercing the corporate veil.  The 
primary impression such piercing leaves is that of uncertainty and unpredictability.  
Such uncertainties are detrimental to the legitimate expectations of the parties to a 
contractual relationship, and involve serious risks associated with the enforcement of 
arbitration awards.  
Although tribunals refer to the theory of group companies and other theories for 
piercing the corporate veil, they often use them without a clear explanation.  As one 
commentator warned, “[i]n debating whether to pierce the corporate veil or treat the 
principal as the alter ego of the subsidiary, the arbitration community often appears 
to rely on  ‘worn epithets’ as a substitute for  ‘rigorous analysis.’”4  This article 
purports to shed more light on the concept of piercing the corporate veil in 
international arbitration, both commercially and arising out of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs). 
Part I discusses the concepts of corporate personality, limited liability, and 
piercing the corporate veil in the theory of corporate law.  It first summarizes the 
main benefits of corporate form–separation of assets, improved monitoring, and ease 
of coordination with creditors.  Then it looks into conceptual foundations of 
unlimited corporate liability and veil piercing.   
The article continues with the analysis of piercing the corporate veil in 
international commercial arbitration.  Part II examines and explains specific 
problems that arise when the concept is examined through the lenses of several 
domestic and international legal regimes.  Problems arise at the jurisdictional stage 
and when the tribunals consider the merits.  Even if a tribunal decides to pierce the 
corporate veil, the award may be set aside in national courts that have jurisdiction 
over the arbitration venue.  Because of the veil piercing, the award can be contested 
when the interested party enforces it in domestic courts under the New York 
                                                                 
 2 1 Kings 12:19. 
 3 Gillis Wetter, A Multi-Party Arbitration Scheme for International Joint Ventures, 3 
ARB. INT’L 2 (1987). 
 4 First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior, 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983).  
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Convention.  At each of these stages, the arbitrators or judges may reach completely 
different results with respect to veil piercing.  
Part III focuses on ICSID jurisprudence.  ICSID awards do not need to be 
recognized in national courts or defended at the arbitration venue.  Review of ICSID 
jurisprudence shows that even under the special procedural regime of the ICSID 
Convention, the attitudes of ICSID tribunals are inconsistent.  Some tribunals refuse 
to assert jurisdiction over corporations that have not signed the arbitration agreement 
on the basis of absence of consent.  Other tribunals look into the issue of foreign 
control to decide whether to extend jurisdiction.  Finally, some ICSID tribunals look 
at corporate entities as a part of investment, and extend subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction over corporations that have not signed the arbitration agreement.  The 
latter approach is justified by looking into the purpose of BITs that are concluded to 
protect foreign investments from host States.  
Part IV concludes by summarizing the pros and cons of piercing the corporate 
veil and suggests careful drafting of arbitration clauses to avoid taking chances with 
such piercing in international arbitration.  
II.  CORPORATE FORM AND VEIL PIERCING  
A.  The Rationale Behind the Corporate Form 
To better understand the concept of piercing the corporate veil, it is helpful to 
examine the need for having the corporate form in the first place.  
Arguably, the main function of corporate law is defining the property rights over 
which the participants in a firm can enter into contracts.5  Henry Hansmann and 
Rainier Kraakman explained that “the essential role of . . . organizational law is to 
provide for the creation of a pattern of creditors’ rights – a form of ‘asset 
partitioning’–that could not be practically established otherwise.”6   
Corporate law scholars divide the benefits of corporate limited liability into three 
groups – separation of assets, improved monitoring, and ease of coordination with 
creditors.  Ronald Coase was the first to explain corporate form by the need for the 
reduction of transaction costs of market coordination with third parties.7  Limited 
liability facilitates the transfer of ownership by allowing owners to separate 
corporate liabilities from their own.8  While, in theory, partitioning of assets with 
each and every creditor separately may be technically possible, the transaction costs 
would be prohibitively high.9   
Corporate asset partitioning therefore shifts the burden of monitoring the firm’s 
managers from the owners to the creditors.10  Other benefits of asset partition include 
                                                                 
5 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L.J. 387, 440 (2000). 
 6 Id. at 390. 
 7 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 8 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 426. 
 9 Id. at 406-07. 
10 Id. at 425. 
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shielding the assets of a firm from the personal creditors of individual owners,11 and 
the costs of conducting business through the creation of subsidiaries.12   
There are two major theories concerning corporate personality – the theory of 
legal fiction, and the entity theory.  According to the legal fiction theory, a 
corporation is a nexus of contracts, a more convenient way of structuring 
relationships with third parties, thereby limiting the participants’ liability.13  The 
entity theory is based on the premise that the state created the corporation by 
granting it a charter, and, therefore, it has a separate “personhood.”14  
The legal fiction supporters argue that the property might be given special 
qualities by the state or through contract, but remains property all the same.15  Thus, 
the existence of a corporation independent of its owners is a fiction: “the rights and 
duties of an incorporated association are in reality the rights and duties of the persons 
who compose it, and not of an imaginary being.”16  The entity theory school regards 
a corporation as an autonomous institutional actor separable from those with an 
interest in it.17   
Very often, reorganization of corporate structure in corporate groups involves 
segregation of especially risky activities in selected subsidiaries to shield the group 
as a whole from tort liabilities.18  As Professor Blumberg put it, in such business 
planning, traditional entity law is being utilized to attempt to create a safe harbor for 
corporate groups seeking to externalize the costs of a subsidiary’s negligence in 
conducting highly risky activities.19   
The principles of state sovereignty and political territoriality make separation of 
assets even more attractive.  When corporations are dispersed across jurisdictions 
with different rules of corporate law, the corporate form allows even more flexibility 
for the owners to structure their assets and limit the reach of creditors. 
                                                                 
11 Id. at 393-94. 
12 Id. at 398, 402. 
13 "The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a 
nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by existence of divisible 
residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold 
without permission of the other contracting individuals." See, e.g. Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).  
14 See, e.g., Mark Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational ‘Real 
Entity’ Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 575-77 (1989).   
15 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 2 (2d ed. 
1886). 
16 Id. at 3. 
17 Gunther Teubner, Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the “Essence" of 
the Legal Person, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 130 (1988). 
18 See, e.g. Richard Rothman, A Veiled Threat: Minimizing Parental Liability for U.S. 
Subsidiaries, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY, August 23, 2007. 
19 PHILLIP BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER 
COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY 
CORPORATIONS (Little, Brown and Co. 1987).  
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The commercial world regards the principle of separation of legal identity and 
liability between different companies as a universal legal assumption.  All major 
industrial countries recognize this principle.20  The development of sophisticated 
multinational corporate structures was a response to various commercial factors, 
such as business expansion and diversification, the need for specialization and 
efficient productive processes, raising capital finance, or reducing taxation liabilities.  
B.  The Concept of Piercing the Corporate Veil 
Piercing the corporate veil essentially means disregarding the separation between 
entities organized in corporate form with limited liability of shareholders.   
A typical corporate veil piercing case involves a controlling shareholder who sets 
up an undercapitalized corporation to incur obligations to a third party. When the 
debt is due, the corporation does not have enough assets to repay it, and the 
controlling shareholder relies on the concept of limited liability to avoid personal 
liability.  The result is that the third party ends up bearing the risk of the non-
payment of the debt.21  In such situations, the court or tribunal may intervene to 
prevent such injustice and pierce the corporate veil by holding the controlling 
shareholder liable.22   
“Reverse veil piercing” involves situations where a creditor of the controlling 
shareholder is allowed to ignore the separateness of the corporation and its 
shareholder to reach the corporation’s assets to satisfy the shareholder’s obligation.  
Reverse corporate piercing is ordinarily available only against one-person 
corporations to prevent recovery from other innocent shareholders.23 
Despite various theories justifying piercing the corporate veil, the general rule of 
corporate law is to maintain the legal separateness of the corporate form.  Piercing 
the veil remains an exception.  Approaches towards piercing the veil differ not only 
from one jurisdiction to another, but also within one national system of law.24  The 
following sections of this article analyze interpretation of piercing the corporate veil 
in international arbitration.  
III.  PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
A.  Approaches of International Tribunals 
In the context of international arbitration, piercing the corporate veil involves 
bringing in the parties that have not signed an arbitration agreement.  These could be 
parent companies, subsidiaries, private individuals, governmental and quasi-
governmental entities, and states.  Piercing the corporate veil can occur in various 
                                                                 
20 OECD, RESPONSIBILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES FOR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES 6, 24 (1980).  
21 Lee Buchheit et al., The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L. J. 1201, 1248 (2007). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 1250.  
24 KARL-HEINZ BOECKSTIEGEL, ARBITRATION AND STATE ENTERPRISES: SURVEY OF THE 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STATE OF LAW AND PRACTICE 41 (1984).  
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contexts, such as human rights,25 environment,26 and tax,27 and the principles on 
which the adjudicators rely are even more diverse.  
In their determination of the merits of a particular dispute, arbitration tribunals 
are usually bound by domestic law.  As already mentioned, there is no consistency 
across national legal systems on the issue of piercing the corporate veil.  Not 
surprisingly, the approaches of international tribunals also vary.   
Generally, arbitrators distinguish between “consenting non-signatories” to 
arbitration agreements that seek to arbitrate, and “non-consenting non-signatories” 
that resist arbitration.28  The tribunals that join non-signatories rely either on implied 
consent or disregard of corporate personality.29  There is no clear line between these 
two justifications, however, as tribunals often pierce the corporate veil as a means to 
enforce the parties’ original intent.  
One of the most well-known examples of piercing the corporate veil for the 
benefit of consenting non-signatories is the Dow Chemical International Chamber of 
Commerce arbitration.30  In that case, the tribunal allowed parent companies to be 
claimants despite the fact that the arbitration clauses were between the defendant and 
subsidiary companies of the same parent group.31   
The tribunal relied on “the common intent of the parties . . . such as it appears 
from the circumstances that surround the conclusion and characterize the 
performance and later the termination of contracts.”32  The tribunal also followed 
“usages conforming to the needs of international commerce, in particular in the 
presence of group of companies.”33  According to the single entity theory applied by 
the tribunal, “[a] group of companies, despite the legal status of each of the 
companies, represents a single economic reality which the arbitral tribunal must take 
into account when ruling on its jurisdiction.”34  
However, application of the “group of companies” doctrine remains uncommon.  
Some authorities suggest only one out of every four cases that purport to apply the 
                                                                 
25 See, e.g., Yaraslau Kryvoi, Enforcing Labor Rights Against Multinational Corporate 
Groups in Europe, 46 INDUS. REL. 366 (2007). 
26 See, e.g., David Bakst, Piercing the Corporate Veil for Environmental Torts in the 
United States and the European Union: The Case for the Proposed Civil Liability Directive, 
19 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 323 (1996). 
27 See, e.g., William W. Park, Fiscal Jurisdiction and Accrual Basis Taxation: Lifting the 
Corporate Veil to Tax Foreign Company Profits, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1609 (1978). 
28 See William W. Park, Non-Signatories and the New York Convention, 2 J. DISP. RESOL. 
INT’L 84, 105 (2008). 
29 Id. at 107.  
30 Id. at 103 (citing Dow Chemical v. Isover St. Gobain, ICC Case No. 4131, 1983 J. Dr. 
Int'l 899 (1932)). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.  
34 Interim Award of September 23, 1982 in No.4131 (original in French), reprinted in IX 
ICCA Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 131, 134 (1984).  
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“group of companies” doctrine did actually extend jurisdiction over non-
signatories.35  
When it comes to arbitration under bilateral investment treaties, the legal regime 
is somewhat different.  It has been suggested that the rules relevant to shareholder 
claims under investment protection treaties need to be regarded as lex specialis as 
established by specific treaties.36  This is so despite the fact that, under the national 
law of most jurisdictions, shareholders are not allowed to bring claims on behalf of 
the company in which they own shares.37  The inclusion of shareholdings into the 
definition of investment in a bilateral investment treaty would normally result in 
piercing the corporate veil for the benefit of the shareholder.38  
It is not enough to persuade the tribunal to pierce the corporate veil under 
applicable law.  The enforcement of awards piercing the corporate veil creates 
additional problems.  
B.  Enforcement of Awards 
Unlike national courts, arbitration tribunals do not have enforcement mechanisms 
of their own and need to resort to national courts.  If they render an award against a 
party that is not subject to an arbitration agreement, it might lead to problems at the 
enforcement stage.  According to the principle of autonomy of the arbitration 
agreement, such agreements do not necessarily have to be governed by the same 
substantive law as the main contract.39  
The application of corporate veil piercing in international arbitration is dependent 
upon domestic courts’ recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards.  The 
special procedure is established by the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, better known as the New York 
Convention.40 
Article V of the New York Convention provides five procedural defects, on 
which national courts can rely to refuse recognition and enforcement of arbitration 
awards.  These are (1) lack of valid arbitration agreement; (2) denial of opportunity 
to be heard; (3) an excess of jurisdiction by an arbitrator in deciding matters beyond 
                                                                 
35 Park, supra note 28, at 106-07 (citing JEAN-FRANCOIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, 
DROIT COMPARE DE L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL ¶¶ 253-54 (2d ed. 2007)). 
36 Abbey Cohen Smutny, Claims of Shareholders in International Investment Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH 
SCHREUER 363 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009). 
37 See OECD, supra note 20. 
38 For instance, Article 1(6) of the Energy Treaty Charter provides that "Investment" 
protected by the Charter includes "a company or business enterprise, or shares, stock, or other 
forms of equity participation in a company or business enterprise, and bonds and other debt of 
a company or business enterprise." The Energy Charter Treaty art. 1(6), Dec. 17, 1994, 34 
I.L.M. 360 (1995). 
39 See NIGEL BLACKABY, CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, ALAN REDFERN, & MARTIN HUNTER, 
REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 117-21 (2009). 
40 UNCITRAL.org, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards of 1958 (the New York Convention), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/ 
arbitration/NY-conv/1958_NYC_CTC-e.pdf. 
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the scope of the arbitration submission; (4) procedure contrary to the parties’ 
agreement; and (5) annulment of the award in the country where rendered.41  
Arguably, an award rendered against a non-signatory can be challenged on the 
basis of any of these grounds, especially if there was no explicit arbitration 
agreement.  For instance, a company that has not signed the arbitration agreement is 
unlikely to be present at the hearings, and is, thus, denied an opportunity to be heard.  
Local courts might set aside an arbitration award against the parent company if the 
arbitration agreement is only signed by its subsidiary.  Moreover, it could indeed be 
unfair for a parent company to defend itself in all national jurisdictions where it can 
be held liable for the debts of its subsidiary.42 
Article II(2) of the 1958 New York Convention, as well as most national legal 
systems, provide that the agreement to arbitrate should be in writing.  The 
requirement that the arbitration agreement be in writing serves a number of 
functions, which include providing evidence as to (1) the conclusion of the 
agreement, (2) identification of the parties to the agreement, and (3) providing 
warning as to the importance of renouncing rights of recourse to the courts.43  If there 
is no agreement in writing, tribunals may decide to pierce the corporate veil.  
One of the most common grounds for refusal to enforce arbitration awards under 
the New York Convention arises from problems connected with a party’s identity in 
the absence of a special agreement in writing.44  There are an increasing number of 
cases in which the respondent summoned in the arbitration takes the position that it 
is not a party to the contract containing the arbitration clause, and, therefore, the 
arbitrators lack competence to decide the case as far as the summoned respondent is 
concerned.45   
Domestic courts apply the New York Convention and limit the enforcement of 
arbitral awards to the parties to the arbitration agreement,46 even though the parties 
belong to the same corporate group.47  For instance, English courts are not very 
enthusiastic about piercing the corporate veil.  In Peterson Farms Inc. v. C&M 
Farming Ltd., the arbitration award was successfully challenged in England on the 
basis that the tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain claims by entities that were not 
specifically named as parties to the arbitration agreement.48 
                                                                 
41 Id. at art.V. 
42 William W. Park, Private Adjudicators and the Public Interest: The Expanding Scope of 
International Arbitration, 12 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 658, 659 (1986).  
43 U.N. Commission on International Trade Law [COITL], Report of the Working Group 
on Arbitration on the Work of its Thirty Second Session (Vienna, 20-31 March 2000), ¶ 89, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/468 (April 10, 2000).  
44 Albert Jan van den Berg, New York Convention of 1958: Refusals of Enforcement, 18 
I.C.C. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN 1, 28 (2007). 
45 Javor v. Francoeur, 2003 BSCS 330, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 195 (Can.). 
46 Van den Berg, supra note 44. 
47 See, e.g., Glencore Grain Limited v. Sociedad Ibérica de Molturación, S.A., STS, Jan. 
14, 2003 (R.J., 38).  
48 Petersen Farms, Inc. v. C&M Farming Ltd., [2004] EWHC (Comm) 121, [2004] 1 
LLOYD’S REPORTS 614.   
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Many domestic legal systems establish a mandatory requirement that the 
arbitration agreement be in writing.49  The United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Working Group on Arbitration proposed 
that the “group of companies” fact pattern might not require a written arbitration 
agreement.50  The report noted that the “group of companies” theory has been applied 
in a number of arbitrations and has met the approval of some courts.51 According to 
the report, the concept requires proof of the following:  
1) that the legally distinct company being brought under the arbitration 
agreement is part of a group of companies that constitutes one economic 
reality (une réalité économique unique);  
2) that the company played an active role in the conclusion and 
performance of the contract; and  
3) that including the company under the arbitration agreement reflects the 
mutual intention of all parties to the proceedings.52  
However, as UNCITRAL noted, national courts increasingly adopt a liberal 
interpretation of the requirement of a written contract, construing it in accordance 
with international practice and the expectations of the parties.53  UNCITRAL is 
particularly concerned that doubts on the interpretation of this requirement, and a 
lack of uniformity in its interpretation would reduce the predictability and certainty 
of international contractual commitments.54   
Despite these new developments at UNCITRAL, the unpredictability with 
respect to arbitrations that involves piercing the corporate veil remains a serious 
problem.  Not only is it unclear whether a particular tribunal would be sympathetic 
towards piercing the corporate veil under applicable domestic law, but the parties 
must face even greater challenges at the stage of enforcement.  ICSID jurisprudence 
is of particular interest because it is regulated by the ICSID Convention,55 a special 
international treaty that eliminates some of the problems identified above.   
                                                                 
49 See, e.g., United States Uniform Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 6 (2000); Arbitration 
Act, 1996, c. 23, §6 (UK); Federal Law of the Russian Federation on International 
Commercial Arbitration, http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/russia.international.commercial.arbitration 
.1993/doc.html.   
50 The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General on Possible Uniform Rules on 
Certain Issues Concerning Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Conciliation, Interim 
Measures of Protection, Written Form for Arbitration Agreement, Addendum ¶¶ 11, 12(m), 
and 12 n.1 delivered to the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law [COITL], Working 
Group on Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108/Add. 1 (Jan. 26, 2000). 
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 3, ¶ 8.  
54 Id. 
55 ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf. 
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IV.  PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN ICSID PROCEEDINGS 
A.  The Legal Regime Under the ICSID Convention 
The empowerment of private parties to submit claims against sovereign states is 
one of the most known achievements of the ICSID Convention.56  A less widely 
recognized development of international law brought by ICSID jurisprudence is the 
increasing willingness of tribunals to pierce the corporate veil.   
Unlike awards of other arbitration tribunals, ICSID awards do not need to be 
enforced in accordance with the New York Convention.  The awards are subject to 
recognition in ICSID Contracting States as if they were a final judgment by a 
domestic court in that State.57 Under Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention, the 
awards are binding on the parties immediately upon rendering.58   
ICSID awards should be recognized and enforced by States as a public 
international law obligation.  It is a generally recognized principle of international 
law that a State may not excuse or cure a breach of its obligations by pleading 
provisions of its own law.59  Therefore even though parties to the ICSID Convention 
may take a very cautious view towards piercing the corporate veil in their domestic 
courts, ICSID awards nevertheless will obligate them, even if they are inconsistent 
with the domestic law of the enforcing country.    
When it comes to piercing the corporate veil, ICSID tribunals permit corporate 
parties of ICSID proceedings to submit claims on behalf of non-parties to the 
proceedings.60  These non-parties are typically either the investor’s shareholders or 
subsidiaries.  Because tribunals usually do not "implead" such third parties, such 
claims amount to piercing the corporate veil.  
It must be noted that the parties may agree to join a non-signatory corporation as 
a party to ICSID proceedings at any time.61  However, most controversies arise when 
one of the parties does not agree to join a new party and there is a need to pierce the 
corporate veil despite one party’s objections. 
                                                                 
56 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is a leading 
international arbitration institution in the field of investor-State dispute settlement. It was 
established in 1966 as a part of the World Bank pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. See YARASLAU KRYVOI, 
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Kluwer Law 
International, 2010). 
57 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States, Oct. 17, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, art. 53(1). 
58 Id. 
59 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 34, 35 (2008).  
60 See discussion infra Part III(b). 
61 See, e.g., S. Pac. Prop. (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/84/3 (Apr. 14, 1988) Decision on Jurisdiction and Dissenting Opinion (Apr. 14, 
1988) (ruling that joining the local company was permissible even despite subsequent 
objections of the State, because the parties voluntarily agreed to join a local company and it 
did not have any claims different from those of the parent company).  
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The issues associated with jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals are resolved in 
accordance with international, not national, law.62  The tribunals rely on the ICSID 
Convention and applicable BITs, as well as on their own jurisprudence, to decide on 
the feasibility of piercing the corporate veil.63  According to Article 25(2)(b) of the 
ICSID Convention:  
[A]ny juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State 
other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties 
consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any 
juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to 
the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the parties 
have agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting State 
for the purposes of this Convention. 
From a reading of Article 25(2)(b), two criteria for the determination of personal 
jurisdiction over corporate entities are apparent. “Nationality” is a formal legal 
criterion, while determination of “foreign control is an objective criterion, which 
seeks to reach the real control over a juridical person.  The issue of establishing 
control was heavily debated during the negotiations of the ICSID Convention.64  
Although no definition was adopted, the Convention’s drafters thought that it should 
be left to each arbitral tribunal to decide the question of control.65 
The following section discusses the jurisprudence of ICSID tribunals on the issue 
of piercing the corporate veil.  
B.  Approaches of ICSID Tribunals 
1.  Formalistic Approach 
ICSID Institution Rule 2 provides that the parties to the arbitration shall be 
precisely designated, and the parties to the dispute should consent in writing to 
submit their dispute to ICSID arbitration.66  A number of ICSID tribunals have 
refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-signatories to ICSID arbitration 
clauses as discussed below.   
Some ICSID tribunals construe ICSID Institution Rule 2 and other similar 
provisions narrowly, and are unwilling to extend their jurisdiction over non-
signatories.  In Tshinvali v. Georgia, the investor submitted claims on behalf of itself 
as well as its three shareholders.67  The tribunal analyzed the issue of standing and 
                                                                 
62 See, e.g., S. P. Prop. (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
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noted that the three shareholders had not been registered as claimants in those ICSID 
proceedings and on this ground ruled that the claimant was not entitled to claim on 
behalf of its shareholders.68  
The Tshinvali tribunal distinguished its case from other ICSID jurisprudence by 
pointing out that there was no parent company where “the ICSID clause is designed 
to work for its benefit.”69  The tribunal pointed out that Rule 2 of the ICSID requires 
that the request of arbitration precisely designate each party to the dispute, and that 
Rule 47 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules provides that the award should contain “a 
precise designation of each party.”70  The tribunal explained that:  
[N]either the ICSID Convention nor the ICSID Arbitration Rules contain 
any express provision permitting parties to assert claims on behalf of non-
parties. . . .  [A]ny such right to of a complaining party requires the 
agreement or “consent” of the respondent Contracting State.71  
The Tshinvali tribunal noted that it was not aware of any ICSID cases where “one 
single party asserted claims not only on its own behalf but also on behalf of other 
non-party entities which were not implicated with a specific written agreement that 
constituted the ‘consent’ of the host Contracting State to such an assertion on their 
behalf.”72 
In other cases, tribunals refrained from going beyond the nationality of the 
claimant corporation to examine whether it is foreign-controlled.  In Rumeli Telecom 
A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Kazakhstan, the tribunal 
noted “nowhere in the ICSID Convention is there a basis for piercing the corporate 
veil of a designated claimant.”73  The arbitrators rejected the application of the 
effective nationality test74 to pierce the corporate veil and reach the real controllers of 
the corporate group.75  It must be noted, that in this case by piercing the corporate 
veil, the tribunal understood disregarding the separateness of legal entities and 
looked into the issue of objective foreign control.  
The issue of determination of foreign control is so controversial that it forced a 
prominent arbitrator to resign from an ICSID panel in one case.  In Tokios Tokeles v. 
Ukraine, one of arbitrators resigned because he disagreed with the approach of other 
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arbitrators, who extended jurisdiction over a company incorporated in a foreign state, 
and 99% of which was controlled by nationals of the Respondent State.76   
The arbitrator argued that such a formalistic approach was against the objectives 
of the ICSID Convention to not facilitate resolution of international investment 
disputes between States and their own nationals.77  The arbitrator also noted that the 
issue of piercing the corporate veil under the International Court of Justice’s decision 
in Barcelona Traction,78 and the fact that no fraud was involved were beside the 
point, given the clear object and purpose of the ICSID Convention.79  
In all the ICSID cases discussed above, tribunals followed a formalistic approach 
and failed to pierce the corporate veil.  The logic is simple: if a corporation is not a 
party to ICSID proceedings, and has not signed an arbitration clause, there is no 
jurisdiction over it.  
2.  Treating Non-Signatory Corporations as “Investors” 
Other ICSID panels do pierce the corporate veil to see whether the corporation is 
indeed controlled by a “foreign investor” under the definition of the ICSID 
Convention.  Two ICSID cases–Vacuum Salt Products Ltd. v. Republic of Ghana80 
and TSA v. Argentina,81 focused precisely on the objective existence of foreign 
control under Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention.   
In Vacuum Salt Products Ltd. v. Republic of Ghana, the issue was whether the 
company was under foreign control, or under the control of Ghana nationals, and as 
such, fell outside of the scope of the tribunal’s personal jurisdiction.82  The tribunal 
noted that because the Government of Ghana agreed to treat the company as a 
foreign national, it created a rebuttable presumption of foreign control for the 
purpose of Article 25 of the Convention.83  
The Vacuum Salt tribunal noted that the reference in Article 25(2)(b) to “foreign 
control” necessarily sets an objective limit beyond which ICSID jurisdiction cannot 
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exist, and parties therefore lack power to invoke the same “no matter how devoutly 
they desire to do so.”84  The tribunal ruled that if the juridical person not controlled 
by foreign investors were allowed to proceed with ICSID claims, the Convention 
would be used for purposes for which it was not intended.85   
The TSA v. Argentina tribunal also highlighted the importance of determining 
real foreign control by noting that it would be inconsistent with Article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention if in establishing foreign control,  
[i]t would be directed to pierce the veil of the corporate entity national of 
the host State and to stop short at the second corporate layer it meets, 
rather than pursuing its objective identification of foreign control up to its 
real source, using the same criterion with which it started.86  
The tribunal ruled that because of the absence of foreign control, it lacked 
jurisdiction to examine the merits of the dispute.87 
Many commentators favor the extension of ICSID tribunals’ personal jurisdiction 
by piercing the corporate veil of foreign-controlled corporations.  Christoph Schreuer 
points out that having more than one party on the investor’s side in one set of 
proceedings is acceptable because it is a consequence of one investment operation 
where companies claimed jointly with their parent companies or their subsidiaries.88   
The criteria put forward by Schreuer in relation to jurisdiction over locally 
incorporated, but foreign controlled companies, are useful.  First, he argues that there 
need not be an explicit consent to permit claims, as was the case in SPP v. Egypt.89  
Second, the fact of foreign control must be established as a question of fact, 
determined not just by shareholding.90  Third, not only direct control, but also 
indirect control over a locally incorporated company might suffice to establish such 
control.91  Schreuer further noted that: 
Where companies other than those named in the consent agreement are 
not necessary parties but are merely economically associated with the 
investment of the investor, they will not be given standing in ICSID 
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proceedings. But the parties before the tribunal may be given the right to 
represent their interests and to claim on their behalf.92 
 C.F. Amerasinghe points out that an ICSID tribunal, unlike the International 
Court of Justice in Barcelona Traction,93 may consider any other criterion, such as 
management, voting rights, shareholding, or any other reasonable theory in 
determining jurisdiction over non-signatories.94  One of such theories appears to be 
treating locally incorporated companies as a part of the investment protected by the 
ICSID Convention or the BIT as explained below.  
3.  Treating Non-Signatory Corporations as “Investment” 
A number of ICSID tribunals regard the use of domestically incorporated 
companies to channel investments as “investment” for purposes of ICSID 
Convention.  Following this logic, if the investor creates local investment vehicles, 
his shares and other forms of participation in them constitute investment.   
According to Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, ICSID tribunals have 
jurisdiction over “any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment.”  The 
drafters of the ICSID Convention deliberately decided not to provide a definition for 
the term “investment.”95  They assumed that this aspect of ICSID jurisdiction could 
be more appropriately controlled by the requirement of consent.96  It has been noted 
that “the requirement that the dispute must have arisen out of an ‘investment’ may be 
merged into the requirement of consent to jurisdiction.”97  
In CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, the tribunal found no bar in 
international law for allowing claims by shareholders independently from those of 
the corporation concerned.98  The CMS Gas tribunal then looked at the definition of 
“investment” and recalled that in accordance with the Argentina-United States BIT, 
shares were given as an example of investment during the negotiations of the 
Convention.99  The tribunal held that there is “no requirement that an investment, in 
order to qualify, must necessarily be made by shareholders controlling a company or 
owning the majority of shares.”100 
The tribunal pointed out that the principle of separation of legal entities of 
Barcelona Traction was not directly relevant to protection of shareholders.101  The 
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tribunal explained that Barcelona Traction was concerned only with the exercise of 
diplomatic protection and “did not rule out the possibility of extending protection to 
shareholders in a corporation in different contexts.”102  The tribunal also found “no 
bar in current international law to the concept of allowing claims by shareholders 
independently from those of the corporation concerned, not even if those 
shareholders are minority or non-controlling shareholders.”103 
An ICSID tribunal in Holliday Inns v. Morocco, also focused on interpretation of 
the term “investment” and impleaded non-signatories on the basis of the “unity of 
investment doctrine.”104  In that case, two parent companies incorporated in the 
United States negotiated a joint venture with the government of Morocco to build 
hotels.105 In order to carry out the project, the parent companies established wholly 
owned Swiss subsidiaries.106 The Government of Morocco signed the “Basic 
Agreement” with local subsidiaries that contained a consent to ICSID arbitration 
clause.107  The parent companies were not signatories to the Basic Agreement, 
although the agreement provided that foreign partners could assign their rights and 
obligations to their affiliates.108   
The tribunal in Holiday Inns examined the common expectations of the parties 
and ruled that the non-signatory U.S. parent companies were proper parties to the 
arbitration according to the “unity of investment doctrine,” to fulfil the common 
expectations of the parties.109 
In another case, IBM v. Ecuador, the U.S. parent company of an Ecuadorian 
subsidiary requested arbitration proceedings on the basis of the United States-
Ecuador BIT.110  Ecuador alleged that the tribunal had no jurisdiction because there 
was no agreement to treat domestic companies as foreign nationals as required by 
Rule 2 of the Institution Rules.  
The IBM tribunal focused its analysis on whether the dispute referred to an 
investment.111  Because the ICSID Convention did not define the term “investment,” 
the tribunal looked to ICSID case law and the definition of “investment” under the 
BIT.112  The tribunal concluded that the dispute arose from an investment of the U.S. 
parent company because  
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(1) it made a direct investment of 100% of the capital of the local entity; 
(2) the contract concluded by the local entity constituted an investment of 
the parent company, since it indirectly belonged to the parent; and (3) the 
right to collect money, capital and interest is a legal and contractual right 
derived from the contracts, with the parent company being the indirect 
owner of that right.113   
The tribunal held that the contract was not only a source of obligations, but also “a 
mechanism through which capital flows from one country to another.”114  Ecuador’s 
objection that the Ecuadorian nationality of the locally incorporated entity precluded 
its parent company from initiating ICSID arbitration had been rejected.115 
Similarly, in AES Corp. v. Argentina, the ICSID tribunal concluded that because 
the definition of “investment” in the Argentina-United States BIT included “every 
kind of investment in the territory of one party owned or controlled directly or 
indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party,” it encompassed local 
companies and satisfied the requirement of recognizing an international 
investment.116  The tribunal concluded that it was proper for the parent company to 
submit claims on behalf of locally incorporated entities it controlled.117 
The ICSID tribunal, in Enron v. Argentina, also considered a claim of a foreign 
investor alleged on behalf of a company incorporated in the host State.118  The 
dispute focused on whether the tribunal had jurisdiction over the locally incorporated 
company.119  The tribunal construed the definition of investment under the 
Argentina-US BIT, which provided that the term “investment” included, inter alia, 
“a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in the 
assets thereof.”120  The tribunal extended its jurisdiction over the companies because 
of the definition of the term “investment” under the treaty: “This definition is the one 
that controls the whole discussion.  It evidently includes the channelling of 
investments through locally incorporated companies, particularly when this is 
mandated by the very legal arrangements governing the privatization process in 
Argentina.”121  
The tribunal interpreted the BIT and concluded that “the Treaty was made with 
specific purpose of guaranteeing the rights of foreign investors and encouraging their 
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participation in the privatization process,” which itself is sufficient to establish its 
personal jurisdiction over a locally incorporated company.122   
Aaron Broches, one of the architects of the ICSID Convention also emphasized 
the importance of the purpose of the ICSID Convention.  He noted in relation to 
determination of foreign control under the ICSID Convention, that “any 
stipulation . . . based on a reasonable criterion should be accepted,” and jurisdiction 
should be declined “only if . . . to do so would permit parties to use the Convention 
for purposes for which it was clearly not intended.”123   
Indeed, the purpose of the treaty is one of the methods for treaty interpretation 
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties.124  Since BITs are usually 
concluded to facilitate foreign investments, piercing the corporate veil may 
legitimately serve that purpose.   
The approach of tribunals that treat corporations as “investment” rather than as 
“investors” resonates with the theory of corporate law, which considers corporations 
as merely legal fictitious entities, not real persons, as discussed at the beginning of 
this article.  Under this approach, ICSID tribunals focus more on subject matter 
jurisdiction over corporations as part of an investment protected by the BIT to 
establish personal jurisdiction.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
There is no easy fix to make the corporate veil-piercing jurisprudence of 
international tribunals consistent and predictable.  However, understanding the 
theory of piercing the corporate veil from the corporate law perspective, and keeping 
track of the principles on which tribunals rely, will certainly help to predict the 
outcomes.   
Piercing the corporate veil may help give a concrete practical meaning to the 
intent of the parties to an arbitration agreement or purpose of a treaty.   However, 
there are downsides of such piercing because it negates many of the benefits that the 
corporate form offers.  The creditors will be in a more difficult position to monitor 
assets, and corporations will be unwilling to take business risks that may result in 
their shareholders’ corporate or personal assets being exposed to liability.    
As a practical matter, it is advisable to make arbitration agreements as inclusive 
as possible to avoid dealing with piercing the corporate veil altogether. 
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